kallendorf questions and implicit categories of interpretation. They thus subtly directed attention to some issues and away from others, highlighted certain phenomena and cast others into the shadows, admitted some evidence but filtered out the rest. I thought I had indications to show that historians see things one way when they wear the hermeneutical spectacles, for instance of "Counter-Reformation Rome," and very differently when they wear those of "early modern Rome." The traditional terms sometimes blind us to incongruities staring us in the face.3
In the words of exiled Spanish novelist Juan Goytisolo, "El lenguaje nunca es inocente" (language is never innocent).4 Or as semiotician Algirdas Greimas would have it, historical discourse is an "ideological machine."5 O'Malley admits that he himself used to adopt a much more nonchalant attitude about terminology (hence the tongue-in-cheek title Trent and All That) until he began to think about its implications. Marshall Brown, in an essay titled "Periods and Resistances," in Periodization: Cutting Up the Past-a special issue of Modern Language Quarterly which appeared in 2001-puts it this way:
Periods are entities we love to hate. Yet we cannot do without them … If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. A collection such as ours is designed to confront the arrogance of the one critic and the timidity of the other, to help us think about why we need chapters of time, how we can make use of them, and how we can resist their seductions.6
Further on in his essay, he cites David Perkins' axiom that periods are "necessary fictions … We require the concept of a unified period in order to deny it."7 He concludes, "Chronology is also a psychology."8 Similarly, Reinhart Koselleck in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time asserts,
